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THE U.N. CONFERENCE ON THE ILLICIT TRADE OF SMALL ARMS AND
LIGHT WEAPONS: AN EXERCISE IN FUTILITY
Bobby L. Scott*
The state of peace among men living in close proximity is not the
natural state (status naturalis); instead, the natural state is one of
war, which does not just consist in open hostilities, but also in the
constant and enduring threat of them.'
In the summer of 2001, the United Nations held its Conference on the Illicit
Trade of Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (hereinafter
"Conference").' With this bold move, the U.N. sought to remove Kant's
looming idea from reality into fiction-to make tranquility among mankind
more than a mere possibility. The Conference, which took years to develop,
attempted seeks to begin the monumental task of reducing and eliminating,
inter alia, the illicit possession, manufacture, transfer and circulation of small
arms and light weapons.3 However, despite its benevolent intentions, the
United Nations created a document that might well produce the very conse-
quences the Conference seeks to prevent: threats to peace and stability,4
civilian deaths and injuries,5 crime and terrorism,6 and even genocide by both
state and non-state actors.7
While any limitation on arms transfers arguably creates such possibilities,
the Conference, through its tool of implementation, the Programme of Action,
seems to exacerbate the problems in several ways. First, the Conference alone
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Immanuel Kant, To Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch (1795), in PERPETUAL PEACE
AND OTHER ESSAYS I l1 (Ted Humphrey trans., 1983).
2 See UNITED NATIONS, REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE ILLICIT
TRADE IN SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS IN ALL ITS ASPECTS, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 192/15
(2001) [hereinafter FINAL REPORT].
See id. at 10-12.
4Id.
' UNITED NATIONS, GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT, REPORT OF THE GROUP OF
GOVERNMENTAL EXPERTS ON SMALL ARMS, U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY, FOREwORD BY THE
SECRETARY-GENERAL, U.N. Doc. A/54/258 at 2, 8 (1999) [hereinafter 1999 REPORT].
6 See FINAL REPORT, supra note 2.
7 See, e.g., Daniel D. Polsby & Don B. Kates, Jr., Of Holocausts and Gun Control, 75
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will not produce a legally binding treaty.8 Thus, instead of a more solid
principle of international law, such as a treaty, the Conference is designed to
be an aspirational "political document," as it would be difficult to achieve a
legally binding agreement given the great divergent political interests of states
and other actors.9 Second, for the purposes of the Conference, there is a
significant definitional problem in the term "illicit". Third, political and
economic realities, such as the economic value of the global arms trade, high
profitability of illegal arms sales due to increased regulation, and bureaucratic
corruption, will probably make successful implementation virtually impossible.
Finally, the Conference, in its implementation, eliminates the human right to
self-determination and destroys a citizen's ability to resist violence and
oppressive regimes. 0 But for these defects, the Conference could have been
a significant advance in the quest for tranquility among men. However, these
problematic characteristics arguably render the entire Conference an exercise
in futility.
The purpose of this Note is to thoroughly identify and analyze the flaws in
the U.N. Conference and its Programme of Action, and to offer suggestions
that would better effectuate the goal sought by the Conference. In order to
achieve this goal, it is necessary to analyze the history and evolution of the
Conference; this will constitute Part I of this Note. Part II will discuss the
defects in particular. Part m will suggest the necessary changes that would
better express the goals and results the Conference seeks to engender.
' Setting the Record Straight, U.N. Conference on the Illicit Trade of Small Arms and Light
Weapons (July 2001), at http://disarmament.un.org/cab/smallarms/Facts.htm.
9 UNITED NATIONS, GENERAL ASSEMBLY, PREPARATORY COMMITTEE FOR THE UNITED
NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE ILLICIT TRADE IN SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS IN ALL ITS
ASPECTS, REPORT OF THE GROUP OF GOVERNMENTAL EXPERTS, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 192/PC/33
(2001) [hereinafter 2001 REPORT].
"0 Common sense dictates that if a society is disarmed, their ability to depose an oppressive
government or otherwise change their government is diminished. See also Kevin J. Worthen,
The Right to Keep and Bear Arms in Light of Thornton: The People and Essential Attributes of
Sovereignty, 1998 B.Y.U. L. REv. 137, 137 (1998).
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I. HISTORY AND EVOLUTION OF THE CONFERENCE
The U.N. is no neophyte in the issue of arms control."' Yet the issues
arising from the illicit trade of small arms and light weapons only became a
primary focus for the U.N. in the mid-1990s. 2 The U.N. General Assembly
pointed to several observations necessitating the international community to
specifically target small arms. Although it is readily recognized that small
arms and light weapons "do not cause the conflicts in which they are used,"
they are held to be "closely related to the increased incidence of internal
conflicts and high levels of crime and violence." 3 Small arms and light
weapons are the weapons of choice for "insurgent forces, criminal gangs and
terrorist groups." 4 Further, these weapons are purported to be widely used for
violence that is in violation of domestic laws and international humanitarian
law. 5 Many allege these weapons are responsible for millions of civilian
casualties. 6 Moreover, there exists a strong concern over the effects these
weapons have on children, many of whom are either victims of armed conflicts
or are forced to become child soldiers.'
7
To address these concerns, in December of 1995 the U.N. issued its
mandate to control "illicit" transfers of small arms and light weapons in
Resolution 50/70B, which requested the Secretary-General to issue a report on
(1) the types of weapons that are used in conflicts in which the U.N. is
involved, (2) the "nature and causes of the excessive and destabilizing
accumulation and transfer of small arms and light weapons, including their
illicit production and trade," and (3) methods to control and eliminate such
accumulations and transfers of small arms and light weapons.1  Pursuant to
this Resolution, the Secretary-General delivered the Report of Governmental
" See, e.g., Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on Use of Certain Conventional
Weapons Which May Be Deemed Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, Oct.
10, 1980, 1342 U.N.T.S. 137. See also TREVORN. DuPuY, ADOCUMENTARYHISTORY OF ARMS
CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT (1973).
" The United Nations General Assembly passed Resolution 50/70 B on December 12, 1995,
giving the Secretary-General a mandate "to report on the phenomenon of small arms." See
UNITED NATIONS, GENERAL ASSEMBLY, GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT, U.N. Doc.
A/52/298 (1997) [hereinafter 1997 REPORT].
' 1999 REPORT, supra note 5, 12.
'4 Id. 13.
,5 See id. 14.
16 Id.
17 Id. 15.
IS G.A. Res. 50/70B, U.N. GAOR 90th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/50/70 A-R (1995).
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Experts on Small Arms ("1997 Report"). 9 This Report, the first of a trilogy
written on small arms and light weapons, is of particular importance, for it laid
the groundwork for subsequent Governmental Expert Reports, the Conference
and the Programme of Action.20
The 1997 Report defined "small arms" to include a wide variety of
weapons, including revolvers, rifles and carbines, sub-machine guns and
assault rifles.2' "Light weapons" comprised of light and heavy machine guns,
grenade launchers, anti-tank and aircraft guns and mortars of calibers less than
100mm.22 However, the 1997 Report also stated that other weapons such as
hunting rifles and "home-made weapons" were also under consideration.23
The 1997 Report found several causes of excessive and destabilizing
accumulations of small arms and light weapons. According to the Report,
accumulations of small arms and light weapons become excessive when a state
does not, inter alia, restrain productions and transfer of these weapons beyond
what is needed for its own defense, when there is no exercise of control over
illegal transfers, or when such weapons are used in "armed conflict.., or other
actions contrary to national or international law."24 The causes cited for the
accumulations ranged from internal conflicts, foreign dominations, or
"violation[s] of the right to self-determination" as expressed in the Charter of
the U.N.2" While the 1997 Report found that the acquisition of small arms and
light weapons are often the result of legal trade, it noted that the illicit
trafficking of such weapons exacerbates many problems that need to be
curbed.26 The Report suggests that illicit trafficking "plays a major role in the
violence" by "supplying the instruments used to destabilize societies and
Governments, encourage crime, and foster terrorism, drug trafficking... and
the violation of human rights."27 Further, the 1997 Report stated that illicit
trafficking also occurs when there is a lack of cooperation between states,
when there are no national controls, or, when there are controls, there is no
enforcement mechanism in place.2" The 1997 Report then defines what
"See 1997 REPORT, supra note 12.
20 See id. 11.
21 See id. 26.
2 Id.
- See id. 728.
24 Id. 37.
25 Id. 40.
26 See id. 750.
27 Id.
28 See id. 159-61.
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constitutes "illicit trade." Any international trade in "conventional weapons,
which is contrary to the laws of States and/or international law" is deemed
illicit.2 9
The 1997 Report then synthesizes commonalities affecting the regions in
which violent conflicts arise. The Group notes that much of the violence is
attributed to small and light weapons,3" and, in conclusory fashion, states that
"illicit trafficking in arms in some regions has violent and destabilizing
effects."'" Finally, the 1997 Report concludes with a list of reduction and
prevention measures, most of which are aimed at states in order to restrict
manufacturing and transfers.32 The Group also recommended further study,
noting that the U.N. should convene a "conference on the illicit arms traae in
all its aspects, based on the issues identified in the present report."33
The aforementioned "further study" was accomplished in the second
installment of the trilogy of the Group of Governmental Experts Reports
("1999 Report").34 While there is much overlap with the 1997 Report, the
primary purpose of the 1999 Report was to determine the progress made in the
implementation of the recommendations from the 1997 Report. 35 The report
found that implementation was not uniform among states, and some recom-
mendations fad not been implemented at all.3' The Group then suggested
further actions necessary to curb the illicit trade similar to those in its prior
report. 3' The 1999 Report concluded with a discussion on the objectives and
scope of the previously planned Conference on the Illicit Trade in All Its
Aspects.3' The Group recommended that the objective of the Conference
should be to strengthen legal norms at the regional, national, and global levels,
and develop agreed-upon international prevention and reduction methods.
Further, the group emphasized the need to mobilize the political will of the
international community to control small arms and weapons, and to promote
national responsibility for arms transfers.39 The scope of the upcoming
"9 See id. 157.
30 See id. 177.
31 Id.
32 See id. IN 79-80.
33 Id. 1 80.
' See 1999 REPORT, supra note 5.
35 See id. 12.
36 See id. 11 73, 76, 81.
37 See id. 1 94.
3 See id. 1 122.
9 See id. 1126.
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conference would focus on the illicit trade of small arms and light weapons
that are manufactured to military specifications; other weapons would also be
considered.4°
The final installment of the trilogy was the 2001 Report of the Group of
Governmental Experts ("2001 Report").4 Again, there was significant overlap
and repetition with the preceding reports. However, the 2001 Report evaluated
a range of procedures and approaches to eliminate illicit trafficking in small
arms and light weapons.42 In this regard, the Group stated that approaches that
curb illicit manufacturing, stockpiling of surplus weapons, and the illicit trade
of small arms and light weapons will cure the ills associated with these
weapons.43
The three Reports can be summarized as follows: first, the U.N. has
attributed various evils to small arms and light weapons. Second, the U.N.'s
approach to dealing with the problem of small arms is to curb the illicit trade
of such weapons. Third, the method of curbing the illicit trade is to control the
legal trade and manufacture of small arms and light weapons." Finally, only
transfers that are contrary to the laws of nations or international law are
"illicit.145 With these points in mind, this Note turns to a consideration of the
Conference, with particular emphasis on the Programme of Action.
The Conference, held in March of 2001, is the culmination of years of
study, as evidenced by the Reports of the Group of Governmental Experts and
other memoranda.' This Note shall focus on the Programme of Action in all
subsequent discussion, for it is the operational document of the Conference.
Before discussing what the Programme of Action actually does, it is necessary
to note certain relevant provisions in the Preamble. The Preamble suggests
that although the Programme seeks to eradicate the illicit trade in small arms
and light weapons, the U.N. nonetheless reaffirms "the inherent right to
individual or collective self-defense in accordance with Article 51 of the U.N.
Charter." 7 Similarly, the Programme of Action reaffirms the right to self-
determination of all peoples, noting specific situations of foreign domination
40 See id. at 130.
4' 2001 REPORT, supra note 9.
42 Id. 33.
43 Id. I 33, 47, 52, 59.
' See 1997 REPORT, supra note 12, 50; see also FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 10, 12.
41 See 1997 REPORT, supra note 12, 157.
' For a more exhaustive view of the documentation leading to the Conference, see http://
disarmament.un.org/cab/smallarms (last visited May 31, 2003).
47 FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 7, 9 (2001).
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or occupation."' The Preamble then states that the Conference "shall not be
construed as authorizing or encouraging any action that would dismember or
impair" sovereign and independent states who conduct themselves "in
compliance with the principle of equal rights and self-determination of
peoples."49 Despite these statements, the Conference does nothing for, or
rather destroys, rights to preserve one's safety from tyrants and despots. This
Note will show that the Conference will likely cater to the oppressor, even
when the policies set forth work in perfect harmony. This is significant, as the
geographical areas at which this Conference is aimed are notorious for
oppression, political assassinations, violence against civilians, and genocide.
50
The Programme of Action sets forth numerous measures to curb the "illicit"
trade of small arms and light weapons at the national, regional, and global
levels."' While the proposed measures at the regional and global levels are
important, subsequent discussion will focus on those measures that are
operative at the national level for two reasons. First, on its face, the Confer-
ence places more emphasis on national measures,5 2 and second, the Confer-
ence's ill effects will be most damaging at national levels. 3
At the national level, the Conference generally seeks to "prevent, combat
and eradicate the illicit trade in small'arms and light weapons." 4  To
accomplish this objective, participating states vow to undertake numerous
48 Id. at 8, 11.
49 Id.
1o For example, the U.N. has made Afghanistan a special case in its crusade against "illicit"
transfers. See 1997 REPORT, supra note 12, at 3 1. At the time of this U.N. report, it can hardly
be maintained that the authority in Afghanistan was an enlightened protector of the rights of
Afghan citizens. It is arguable that the Taliban used these small arms and light weapons as tools
of oppression. It also must be noted that the Taliban employed gun control, and ended it only
in the face of a U.S. attack. See Taliban Increase Security, Threaten to Kill US Agents, Oct. 25,
2001, A.P., available at HindustanTimes.comlnonfram/251001/dLAME20.asp [hereinafter
TALIBAN INCREASE SECURrY]; see also Gregory Bluc, Afghanistan: Geopolitics and a Festering
Crisis, Sept. 26,2001, available at http://www.uvic.ca/-blueg/1 I -Sep-2001 panel.htm#Bunton.
Ironically, many weapons that would be "wrongful" under the U.N. Conference were probably
used by Anti-Taliban tribal groups to help end the regime's rule.
"' See FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 10-14.
S2 A total of twenty-two paragraphs focuses exclusively on nations, while only eighteen
paragraphs are aimed at measures to be adopted at the regional and global levels. See id.
13 It is the author's position that the Conference's "political" message could be utilized by
heads of state to oppress its own people, partly by prohibiting them from possessing a means to
defend themselves from governments and other groups, such as rebel forces operating within a
state during civil uprisings. Thus, most of the damage would occur at a national level.
54 See FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 10, 11.
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measures in the Programme of Action which can be classified as measures
seeking to control the illicit manufacture, trafficking, transfer, trade, posses-
sion and stockpiling of small arms and light weapons;55 measures seeking to
adequately control the legal trade, thereby reducing the illegal trade; 6 and
measures that set up organizational support mechanisms for measures to
combat the illicit trade." This Note will discuss each type of measure in detail
before any assessment on their effectiveness or desirability.
Most measures within the Programme of Action are aimed at curbing the
illicit trade." First, the Programme of Action states that participating States
agree to put into effect legislation that will "prevent illegal manufacture of and
illicit trafficking in small arms and light weapons, or their diversion to
unauthorized recipients.""' Second, the document urges States to establish
national criminal offenses that penalize the "illegal manufacture, possession,
stockpiling and trade of small arms and light weapons" within that State's
jurisdiction.' Third, States are to identify groups and individuals who are
involved in the illegal "manufacture, trade, stockpiling, transfer, possession,
as well as financing for acquisition, of small arms and light weapons," and to
prosecute those individuals under that States' laws.6 States are also expected
to adopt measures to prevent the "manufacture, stockpiling, transfer and
possession of any unmarked or inadequately marked weapons."62 Finally,
States pledge to take action against any arms transfers that violate U.N. arms
embargoes.63
The Programme of Action also utilizes controls on the legal trade to combat
the illicit market for small arms and light weapons." First, States are to
" See id. at 10-12.
S6 See id.
"See id. at 10-12, 7 4, 5, 10.
5 While most measures are aimed specifically at curbing the illegal trade in small arms and
light weapons, there are other measures directed at legal transfers or possession. See, e.g., id.
at 10,19.
'9 Id. at 10, 2.
6 Id. at 10, 3.
61 Id. at 10,76.
62 Id. at 10, 8.
63 See id. at 1l, 15.
" Although the U.N. Report on the Conference on its face deals with "illicit" small arms and
light weapons, it seems obvious that the Conference seeks to limit all transfers of such weapons.
See 1997 REPORT, supra note 12, 78 (recommending measures to "reduce excessive and
destabilizing accumulation and transfer of small arms and light weapons."); see also FINAL
REPORT, supra note 2, at 10-12, 11 7, 9, 10.
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require manufacturers within their jurisdiction to "apply an adequate and
reliable marking" on all small arms and light weapons made; such markings
are to identify the national origin and manufacturer of each weapon and aid in
identifying and tracing the weapon after sale.65 Further, States are to keep
thorough records on the manufacture, possession, and transfer of each weapon
within their jurisdiction, as well as enacting legislation to ensure that such
weapons are traced.66 Participating states also pledge to enact a strict regime
of export controls on small arms and light weapons in an effort to prevent
diversion of such weapons into the illegal trade;67 this includes the use of "end-
user certificates"68 to ensure no retransfer of small arms and light weapons
takes place without prior authorization of the original supplier State.
Moreover, participating States are to develop adequate legislation to regulate
arms broker activities, likewise aimed to curb the diversion of "legal" arms
into illicit markets.69
Other provisions, also aimed at the legal trade and possession of small arms
and light weapons, provide for the destruction of surplus weapons lawfully
owned by the State (which include government-seized weapons from
violators)7 and adequate management of government-controlled weapons.7'
The third category of provisions within the Programme of Action can be
referred to as organizational or administrative support mechanisms, designed
to aid States' efforts to combat the problems associated with small arms and
light weapons." First, States vow to establish bureaucracies to provide "policy
guidance" and monitoring of efforts to eradicate the illicit trade.73 It is
assumed that these agencies would likely be responsible for supervising the
suggested licensing, record-keeping, marking, monitoring and import/export
65 See id. at 10-12,17,
6See id. at 10-11, i9, 10.
67 Seeid. at 11, 11.
68 Id.
69 See FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 11, 1 14.
70 See id. at 11,1 16.
71 See id. at 12,1 18. This provision is an attempt to address the 1997 Albanian debacle, in
which protesters raided military and police depots, where some raids resulted in an 80 percent
loss of total weapons holdings. Many of these stolen weapons ended up in conflict areas such
as Kosovo. See Rachel Stohl & Col. Dan Smith, Small Arms in Failed States: A Deadly
Combination (1999), available at http://www.cdi.org/issues/failedstates/march99.htm.
72 These measures implement agencies, points ofcontact and policy direction between States.
See FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 10, 4.
73 See id.
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control measures advocated by the Programme of Action.7" States are also to
set up "national points of contact," to act as a sort of arms ambassador, for
information sharing among countries regarding the implementation of the
Programme of Action.7" Finally, participating States are to develop disarma-
ment, demobilization and reintegration programs in order to eradicate the illicit
trade.76
I1. FAILINGS OF THE U.N. CONFERENCE
One can concede that the Conference's objective, to secure freedom from
wanton violence perpetuated by evil men, is the epitome of civilized thought,
and further, that several measures set forth in the Programme of Action seem
properly poised to achieve this objective. However, there seem to be several
fundamental flaws within the Conference and its vehicle of implementation,
the Programme of Action, which render the Conference ineffective, and
perhaps could be utilized to exacerbate the violence. This, in turn, makes the
document a cumulation of wasted resources, evidence of a misguided
approach, and overall, a representation of the international community's failure
to adequately address the problems that create threats to innocent civilians.
In particular, the flaws are several; some result from realities for which the
international community as a whole cannot be responsible. Yet other flaws
may be directly linked to the overly naive and idealistic mentality that is
characteristic of many international activists and organizations. The
Programme of Action's shortcomings can be summarized as follows: first, it
is a non-binding "political" document; there are no teeth, and hence no real
enforcement. Although this is a significant criticism, the unenforceability of
the Conference is actually a blessing. As history indicates, disarmament can
result in serious infractions of human rights.7 Second, the Conference is
ambiguous, and at times even contradictory in its definitions of "illicit" and
"small arms" and "light weapons"; this undermines its authority. Third, the
regime of controls and agencies advocated by the Programme of Action are
accompanied by prohibitive costs that make the plan simply unfeasible,
particularly for countries that are most in need of order. Finally, in certain
74 See id.
75 See id. at 10, 5.
76 See id. at 12, 21.
77 See generally JAY SIMKIN ET AL., LETHAL LAWS (1994); see also Polsby & Cates, supra
note 7.
[Vol. 31:681
ILLICIT TRADE OF SMALL ARMS
situations, perfect compliance with the Programme of Action would absolutely
allow oppressors to commit crimes against humanity, in that the oppressed will
be unarmed and unable to defend themselves. Each of these four flaws will be
individually examined in the following sections.
A. Prima Facie Unenforceability
The Conference's most obvious defect is its admitted unenforceability.
Indeed, it was previously recognized that the possibility of creating a legally
binding measure was not likely.78 Subsequent U.N. statements attest to this
reality, noting that the Conference "will not become international law and will
not result in a legally binding treaty." '79
Three factors account for the Conference's prima facie unenforceability.
First, several U.N. member states are responsible for a bulk of the worldwide
arms trade, and because the Conference also affects the legal trade, it would
no doubt be difficult to get states who anticipate activity in arms trade to agree
to restrictions on such a profitable industry." For example, the five permanent
members of the U.N. Security Council-the United States, Russia, China, the
United Kingdom and France-are responsible for a large portion of the
worldwide arms trade.8" Since the legal trade in small arms has an estimated
worth of 7 to 10 billion U.S. dollars, it is no surprise that states are unwilling
to succumb to controls.8" Other factors responsible for the Conference's
unenforceability are the "lack of sufficient national experience with brokering
regulations," and the lack of "agreed criteria" for such controls. These factors
have made creating a legally binding document difficult to achieve. 3 These
factors had the practical effect of regulating the Conference to a utopic
' See 2001 REPORT, supra note 9, 183.
'9 Setting the Record Straight, supra note 8.
80 See, e.g., Statement by Ambassador Wang Yingfan of the People's Republic of China to
the U.N., July 9,2001, available at http://disarament.un.org/cab/smallarms/statements/ChinaE.
html; Statement by John R. Bolton, United States Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and
International Security Affairs (July 9, 2000), available at http://disarmiament.un.org/cab/
smallarms/statements/usE.html. Both China and the United States vehemently defended its
country's ability to participate in the legal trade. Id.
S See Jeffrey Boutwell & Michael T. Klare, Scourge of Small Arms, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN,
June 2000, available at http:/www.sciam.com (June 2000).
82 Id.
" See 2001 REPORT, supra note 9, 183.
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'talkfest'; many human rights groups have even dubbed the Programme of
Action a "Program of Inaction." 4
Several implications flow from the Conference's unenforceability. First,
it appears the international community cannot adequately confront the true
causes behind the rash of violence and lawlessness allegedly associated with
small arms and light weapons; the conference merely seeks to treat the
symptoms with a collection of unenforceable measures. This, in part, is
attributable to the troubling fact that many of the leaders of the international
community are unwilling to sacrifice fluctuations in their gross domestic
product (GDP) to confront forces that result in the gross violations of human
rights, domestic, and international law. 5 Rather, States are willing to make
token statements on eradicating "illicit" transfers of small arms and light
weapons, even when such "illicit" transfers make up only ten to twenty percent
of all arms transfers.8 6 Any efforts to eliminate the evils attributed to small
arms and light weapons must attack those ills that cause most conflicts in the
first instance."
A second implication flowing from the Conference's unenforceability is
that States are willing to demonize small arms and light weapons with mere
"political" measures that will not significantly alter the status quo, rather than
attack root causes of the problem. Again, it cannot be over-emphasized that
many commentators and criminologists agree that small arms do not "cause"
the atrocities that civilized societies seek to abate.8 Thus, the question must
be asked: why do activists and governments insist on eradicating weapons as
a means to solve such multifaceted problems as ethnic violence, genocide and
crimes against women, children and civilians? It cannot be denied that small
Human Rights Watch, UN.: "Program of Inaction" on Small Arms (July 19, 2001),
available at http://www.hrw.org/press/2001/07/smallarms07l9.htm.
"s The 1997 Report acknowledged that conflicts involving small arms and light weapons
arise from "complex political, commercial, socio-economic, ethnic, cultural and ideological
factors." See 1997 REPORT, supra note 12, 38.
86 See SMALL ARMS SURVEY 2001: PROFILING THE PROBLEM 165 (2001); see also Boutwell
& Klare, supra note 81.
7 See 1997 REPORT, supra note 12, 38. The international community must first deal with
the admitted cause ("complex political, commercial, socio-economic, ethnic, cultural and
ideological factors") rather than deal with the effects that could result in the deprivation of
human rights and hinder the ability of an individual to defend themselves from oppressors.
8 See 1997 REPORT, supra note 12 ("[A]ccumulations of small arms and light weapons by
themselves do not cause the conflicts in which they are used."); see generally Don B. Kates et
al., Guns and Public Health: Epidemic of Violence or Pandemic of Propaganda?, 62 TENN. L.
REV. 513 (1995).
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arms and light weapons do play a part in these problems; however, a
Conference that makes "illicit" transfers "super-illegal" will not solve the
problems sought to be curbed. This is perhaps due to the utopic liberal
idealogy that is characteristic of many international activists, representatives,
and NGOs dealing with firearm control issues.8 9 For example, most of the
NGOs and representatives emphatically support arms control measures, and
arms control is most often an argument used by liberal groups in the United
States and other countries.* Regardless, it appears the major proponents of the
Conference are guided by more liberal philosophies when it comes to
controlling weapons-related violence, many of which naively believe that
simply issuing a "political statement" will become a first step in solving the
scourge of small arms. Yet the problems associated with the atrocities
committed with small arms and light weapons are far too complex to be
conquered by a Conference that will only combat the "illicit trade" of such
weapons.
Thus, the Conference's unenforceability displays a general inadequacy in
dealing with the problems associated with the illicit small arms and light
weapons trade. Further, it accentuates the fundamental flaws with the
philosophy and methodology employed to deal with the real and preventable
violence at issue. Unenforceability, then, is a double curse: it shows that the
international community is unwilling to face the real issues regarding the
problem, and it shows that the international community cannot be steadfast
even with a possibly flawed plan of attack.
While the Programme of Action is not a legally binding document,
however, it may work to establish international norms that will eventually
become the basis of binding customary international law.9" The U.N. has
asserted that although the Conference will not produce a legally binding treaty,
the Conference shall reach its goals by the "promotion of international norms
and cooperation to combat the illicit trafficking in small arms and light
"' For example, of all NGOs and activists (approximately forty-one) represented at the
Conference, only twelve represented gun ownership groups, and most, if not all, of the gun
ownership groups only wanted to divert the Conference's focus from sporting arms. See
generally UNITED NATIONS, CIVIL SOCIETY GROUPS HIGHLIGHT IMPACT OF FIREARMS INJURIES,
GUN OWNERSHM RIGHTS IN SMALL ARMS CONFERENCE DEBATE, U.N. Doc. DC/2792 (2001),
available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2001/DC2792.doc.htm [hereinafter CrVIL
SOCIETY GROUPS].
o See id. and accompanying text; see also, e.g., Michael C. Dorf, What Does the Second
Amendment Mean Today?, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 291, 291 (2000).
91 See, e.g., Louis HENKIN ET AL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 54 (3d ed. 1993).
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weapons."92 Certain norms of behavior between states can eventually become
rules of customary international law.93 This is generally accomplished by
satisfying two elements of customary international rules of law: (1) the
material element of state practice, and (2) applying to these elements the
psychological element of opiniojuris sive necessitatis." A rule can become
a binding principle of international law when state practice of a rule is
constant, uniform, and employed for a sufficient duration,9" and when states
maintain a conviction that this practice is accepted as law. 6
Given the elements required to create binding customary international law,
it is conceivable that the Conference, or at least the policies espoused, may
well become binding. As states are numerous, uniform, and consistent in
applying curbs on illicit transfers, and such application is of sufficient length,
the material element would be met.97
The question of opiniojuris, however, requires more than the existence of
social customs; rather, states must feel obligated to follow a custom because
it is compulsory rather than discretionary." Thus, states must perceive that a
principle of law is legally binding before it can be considered customary
international law. 9 This would certainly be accomplished, given the Confer-
ence's method of operation: participating states are to pass domestic laws
aimed at to curbing the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons."°
Supposing that a sufficient number of participating states enact similar laws
regarding illicit transfers of small arms and light weapons, compliance with
such a rule will be more obligatory and less discretionary.'1 Despite a finding
of opiniojuris, some commentators argue that opiniojuris is unnecessary, and
92 Setting the Record Straight, supra note 8.
91 See TIM HILLIER, SOURCEBOOK ON PUBuC INTERNATIONAL LAW 65 (1998).
See V.D. DEGAN, SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 143-44 (1997).
95 "Opiniojuris sive necessitatis" is defined as the conviction of states that a social habit is,
according to international law, obligatory or right. See id. at 162-63. It is literally defined as
"belief or opinion of law or of necessity." See HILLIER, supra note 93, at 80.
SId. at 162.
9' See id.
9' See HILI1ER, supra note 93, at 66.
See REBECCA M.M. WALLACE, INTERNATIONAL LAW A STUDENT INTRODUCTION 16 (2d
ed. 1992).
'o See FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 10-12.
101 See HILLR, supra note 93, at 66. Cf. Right of Passage Case (Port. v. India), 1960 I.C.J.
40 (Apr. 12) (stating "that practice was accepted as law by the parties and has given rise to a
right and a correlative obligation").
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that all that is necessary to give rise to a rule of customary international law is
adequate state practice. 102
Thus, despite its prima facie non-binding status, the policies of the
Conference may in the future become binding principles of international law.
Because there is a likelihood that the principles will become binding, the
Conference's potential effects on oppressive and genocidal regimes must be
addressed. 3
In sum, the Conference is an ineffective tool to eliminate the illicit trade in
small arms and light weapons. The ineffectiveness is due to factors such as the
high value of global arms transfers, the general prohibition ideology espoused
by the international conmunity, 1° and the failure to strongly confront the
underlying causes of violence in the modem world. Until these concerns can
be adequately confronted, the impediments to achieving the goal of decreased
violence and indiscriminate killing will remain.
B. Ambiguity and Contradiction
The Conference's ambiguity and inconsistency work to further discredit the
Programme of Action. The ambiguity is twofold: first, the meaning of "illicit"
transfers, for the purposes of control, is unclear; second, which weapons are
included in the definition, of "small arms and light weapons"? A clear answer
to this inquiry is difficult to find. In the 1999 Report, the Panel of Governmen-
tal Experts declared that the "primary focus of attention should be on small
arms and light weapons that are manufactured to military specifications."' 5
However, other official United Nations documents show that other arms, such
as sporting rifles and shotguns, are under the purview of the requested
controls. 106 Statements and positions of NGOs and activists, who essentially
want to rid the world of all small arms and light weapons, support this
102 See DEGAN, supra note 94, at 173 (stating "that where a consistent practice be proved, a
certain presumption may arise in favor of the existence of the opiniojuris, so that the burden of
proof lies on the opposing party" to show the usage is a result of courtesy to refute the existence
of customary law); see also H1 LI IR, supra note 93, at 51.
103 See infra Part II.D.
104 For further discussion on the failures of prohibitory techniques to deal with such
multifaceted problems, see Part III.A, infra.
05 1999 REPORT, supra note 5, 130; see also 1997 REPORT, supra note 12, 24.
106 See 2001 REPORT, supra note 9, at 21 (stating that "small arms" include revolvers, self-
loading pistols and rifles").
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conclusion. 7 Thus, without explicitly stating so, the Conference seeks to
regulate legal and illegal transfers of all small arms and light weapons, not just
those that are primarily military weapons.' 8 No statements regarding a focus
on military-style weapons appear in the Final Report of the United Nations
Conference on the Illicit Trade of Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its
Aspects. 09
This particular ambiguity is significant in that it mars the credibility of the
Conference in terms of focus and philosophy. It displays the failure of
participating states to focus on the primary problem: military-style weapons."'
Further, it again shows the international community's naive view that simply
controlling all small arms and light weapons by government force will make
the problem go away. Instead of proposing measures narrowly tailored to stop
the violence, it instead trumpets sweeping abolitionist measures characteristic
of ultra-liberal anti-gun proponents. The Conference thus appears to be not
just a stance against violence and oppression, but merely another anti-gun
political statement.
While all weapons could be suspect when the international community
seeks to deal with tyrants, terrorists, criminals and drug cartels, a majority of
the arms used to commit the acts sought to be curbed are within the distinct
category of military-style weapons."' However, the Conferences' ambiguous
'07 See CIVIL SOCIETY GROUPs, supra note 89. IANSA, a NGO participating in the
Conference, seeks to eliminate "the conditions that foster reliance on private arms for self
defense" and to create "norms of non-possession." See JANSA Purpose and Objectives,
available at http://www.iansa.org/about/M I.htm# 1 (2003). Further, the title of one publication
located on the United Nations' Small Arms Conference Website best exemplifies the
international attitude towards all small arms: "[l]et's Go Out Into the World and Gather Up The
Small Arms." See Mark Malloch Brown & Jayantha Dhanapala, Let's Go Out Into The World
And Gather Up The Small Arms, INT'L HERALD TRIB. Jan. 26 2000, available at http://www.
iansa.orglmission/newspub/dhanapala.htm.
"o See 1999 REPORT, supra note 5, 130; see also 2001 REPORT, supra note 9, at 21.
109 See FINAL REPORT, supra note 2. Initially, the U.N. was to focus on weapons manufac-
tured to military specifications; however, this focus was somehow lost in the transition to the
Final Report. See 1997 REPORT, supra note 12, 8.
"o See, e.g., Small Arms Proliferation-The Next Disarmament Challenge, Worldwatch Press
Release on Small Arms Proliferation (Oct. 25, 1997), available at http://www.worldwatch.org/
alerts/pr97l025.html.
".' See id.; see also 1999 REPORT, supra note 5, 130; see also Joost Hiltermann & Loretta
Bondl, State Responsibility in the Arms Trade and the Protection of Human Rights, For the
Workshop on Small Arms, organized by the Government of Switzerland, Geneva, February 18-
20, 1999, available at http://www.hrw.org/campaigns/mines/l 999/geneva-0299.htm (stating that
in many cases of human rights violations, the perpetrators used military surplus weapons shipped
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definition, which encompasses virtually any type of weapon, presumably
including family heirlooms and sporting firearms, undermines its focus and
sacrifices the political capital that is needed to craft a legally binding document
that will curb the wrongful violence perpetuated by criminals, despots and
terrorists.1
2
The second critical ambiguity is the definition of "illicit" transfers that are
subject to the proposed measures. At first blush, the meaning seems relatively
apparent; the definition of an "illicit transfer" is specifically defined transfers,
constituting "international trade in conventional weapons, which is contrary
to the laws of States and/or international law."". The ambiguity lies not in its
semantics, but rather in its consequences. For example, the Taliban, under the
leadership of Mullah Mohammed Omar, vowed to guarantee a peaceful and
secure community on the condition that citizens agree to surrender their
arms." 4 Once the Taliban was firmly in power, the regime committed gross
violations of human rights on disarmed constituents, such as the murder of
civilians" 5 and minorities, requiring minorities to wear identification," 6 and
the oppression of women."7
As the Taliban had prohibited civilian possession of firearms, the
supporting of actors that may wish to improve human rights by supplying those
oppressed with firearms to oust undemocratic and corrupt governments, would
from other states); see also Christopher Carle & Patricia Lewis, Removing Military Weapons
From Civilian Hands, UNDIR Geneva, August 2000, available at http://www.fas.org/asmp/
campaigns/smallarms/disus.htm.
"I For example, the United States has stated that the use of firearms for hunting and sport
shooting are a "legitimate aspect of national life" [in the United States] and that it would not
support measures that abrogate these acceptable uses of firearms. As the U.S. is a worldwide
leader in the firearms industry, any binding international measures may have to acknowledge
these concerns. See Statement by John R. Bolton, supra note 80; see also CrViL SOCIETY
GROUPS, supra note 89, at 7.
' 1997 REPORT, supra note 12, 57.
".. See Indira Lakshmanan, How Omar Led Taliban to Power, Then Defeat, BOSTON GLOBE,
Dec. 9, 2001, at AI; see also TALiBAN INCREASE SECURITY, supra note 50.
"' See Press Release, Human Rights Watch, Afghanistan: Taliban Massacres Detailed (Feb.
19, 2001), available at http://www.hrw.org/press/2001/02/afghan02l9/htm.
"I6 See Press Release, Human Rights Watch, Afghanistan: Taliban ID Policy Creates Second-
Class Citizens (May 24,2001), available at http://www.hrw.org/press/2001/05/afghan-0524.htm.
". See Meri Melissi Hartley-Blecic, The Invisible Women: The Taliban's Oppression of
Women in Afghanistan, 7 ILSA J. INT'L & COMp. L. 533, 534 (2001) (stating that "women are
prohibited from obtaining employment outside the home, obtaining a formal education, leaving
their homes without a male family member to chaperone them, obtaining medical treatment, and
appearing in public without being completely covered by a burqa").
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be contrary to the Conference.' This presents an irony in that humanitarian
groups, who almost universally advocate the end of illicit arms transfers,
would also inadvertently support measures that may prolong the oppression
(i.e., by preventing groups from obtaining the necessary arms to oust their
oppressor)." 9 Secondly, the flexibility of the term "illicit," if this definition
survives the transition from proposed measures to adoption in legally binding
instruments, may be so amorphous that it can be used to actually aid oppres-
sive regimes. This position, also advocated by the United States,'"0 has
significant merit in light of the frequency of modern-day genocides and
oppression. 12
Thus, the Conference's ambiguity in scope and definition pose some
substantial problems in any efforts to achieve any appropriate consensus on
how to minimize and eliminate the predominant concerns of the international
community, including civilian deaths, oppression and genocide. The
Programme of Action's definitional problem of what constitutes a "small arm"
evidences the international community's inadequacy in focusing on the
problem weapons (i.e., military weapons), and further exemplifies the ultra-
liberal position that is unlikely to achieve universal support.
C. Implementation Difficulties
The measures advocated by the Conference's Programme of Action will
also likely fall prey to difficulties of implementation. The likelihood of
" A likely counter-argument would be that since the Taliban was not widely recognized as
a government, it would not be subject to the definition of "illicit" within the meaning of the
conference, as it is not a "State." Such a position would complicate solutions, as the distinction
between the doctrines associated with the recognition of "states" (i.e. Afghanistan) rather than
"governments" (i.e. the Taliban) is a rather murky and unresolved issue. See Thomas D. Grant,
An Institution Restored?, 39 VA. J. INT'L L. 191 (1998) (reviewing MARTHA J. PETERSON,
RECOGNITION OF GOVERNMENTS: LEGAL DOCTRINE AND STARE PRACTICE, 1815-1995 (1997));
see also M.J. Peterson, Recognition of Governments Should Not Be Abolished, 77 AM. J. INT'L
L. 31 (1983). Nevertheless, such arguments are without merit, for numerous countries could
have provided a similar example for the purposes of this Note (i.e. Nazi Germany, Cambodia,
etc.); Afghanistan was chosen because of its currency, to display that such atrocities still occur
today.
"' Cf. Virginia Hart Ezell, U.N. Confab Oks Global Curb on Small Arms, available at http://
www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/article.cfm?id=6 18.
0 See Statement by John R. Bolton, supra note 80.
2 See Polsby & Kates, supra note 7, at 1238 (quoting Elie Wiesel, who stated that "this
century has been the most violent in recorded history. Never have so many people participated
in the killing of so many people.").
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corruption, fueled by profit-making motives, as well as the limited resources
of targeted states and the absence of the rule of law in those states, makes
implementation improbable.
First, profit and corruption will likely be obstacles for implementation.
Typically, arms transfers occur in one of four ways: stable state to stable state,
stable state to unstable state, unstable state to unstable state, and the diversion
of transfers of both stable and unstable states to unintended areas.' Although
the first path may have consequences towards which the Conference is
directed, it is clear that the Conference's focus is directed at the second, third
and fourth types of transfers.1
23
The Programme of Action's measures would certainly be successful, if
implemented, at curbing or eliminating stable state to stable state transfers.
Stable states typically enjoy the benefits of an established legal system,
accountability, and external diplomatic relations, for example, to ensure
performance. However, in the latter methods of transfer, these characteristics
are often absent. In many countries experiencing intra-state conflicts, arms
strategies are "vague or non-existent due to the absence of any recognisable
government."'2" Similarly, a vicious cycle of arms transfers often occurs in
African conflicts, where newly formed "governments" willingly transfer arms
to rebel forces in neighboring countries already experiencing civil unrest. For
example, civil war in Liberia resulted in a victory for warlord Charles Taylor;
he successfully toppled the existing government, although fighting subse-
quently continued. 5 Once in power, he transferred arms to an ally who was
engaged in civil strife in neighboring Sierra Leone." 6 It would be incredible
to maintain that unstable countries such as these will adopt, implement, and
maintain the arms controls proposed. Any measure to contain unstable to
unstable state arms transfers must focus on the root problems of "inequality,
poverty, corruption," and "political lethargy," rather than the effects of such
' For the purposes of this Note, the phrase "stable states" is defined as states operating
under a well-established rule of law, affording consistent protection to their citizens and devoid
of sovereignty-threatening civil strife.
1' This is supported by a focus on states dealing with insurgency and its after-effects. See,
e.g., 1997 REPORT, supra note 12, 13-16, 19, 40-52.
"2 See Lt. Commander A.L. Siew, Arms Control: The Panacea of Small Arms and Light
Weapons Proliferation? (1997), available at http://www.cfcsc.ca/irc/nh/nh/9798/0079/htrnl; see
also Stohl & Smith, supra note 71.
"u See Boutwell & Klare, supra note 81.
126 See id.
2003]
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
problems.' To treat only the effects would be to prolong the underlying
problems.
The Conference has sought to deal with this issue by proposing that
member states impose measures to prevent unstable to unstable state transfers.
At the national level, the Conference seeks to penalize "illegal" transfers
among states; narrowly tailored, such measures should eliminate unstable to
unstable state transfers, presuming originating states will classify transfers to
common diverter states as illicit, and enforce the measures appropriately.'
In addition, other measures are aimed at preventing the diversion of small arms
into trouble areas; these include a marking system 29 and end-user
certificates, 30 which attempt to keep track of unaccounted-for arms transfers.
Further, the Programme of Action's regional measures are relevant here. At
the regional level, the participating states pledge the "strengthening and
establishing" of moratoria or similar initiatives aimed at conflict zones or
otherwise unstable governments in order to prevent arms diversion.' 3 '
As noted, curbing the illicit arms trade will be futile if success depended on
unstable states for enforcement. Thus, any improvement must come from
stable states, as most small arms originate in stable states. '32 However, it will
be difficult to depend on these states. First, due to numerous factors, 33 the
States predominantly responsible for most small arms will most likely be
unwilling to cut back on the arms export industry. 34 A prevalent example is
the United States. The U.S. has long been a world leader in arms exports
(including conventional weapons),' and is among the world leaders in small
127 See Siew, supra note 124.
128 See FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at pt. II, 6.
129 Id. 7.
130 Id. 12.
13 Id. 26.
132 See Boutwell & Klare, supra note 81; see also Lucien J. Dhooge, We Arm the World: The
Implications ofAmerican Participation in the Global Armaments Trade, 16 ARIZ. J. INT'L &
CoMip. L. 577 (1999).
"33 Part II.D of this Note specifically addresses the U.S. position on supplying arms to rebels
or civilians to aid in fighting a repressive government.
" For example, China, Russia, and the United States, all of which rank in the top five of the
World Military Expenditures and Arms Experts Report (see infra note 135), are unwilling to
agree to limits on their respective arms export industries. See 1999 REPORT, supra note 5, at 8,
16, 20; see, e.g., Statement by John Bolton, supra note 80; Statement by Ambassador Wang
Yingfan, supra note 80.
'35 See U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, WORLD MILITARY EXPENDITURES AND ARMS TRANSFERS 3
(1998), available at http:/www.state.gov/www/global/armsbureau-ac/wment98.html.
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arms manufacturing. a6 The United States has maintained its position as a
global leader in exports despite its clients' involvement in oppression and
conflict. In 1997, for example, the United States supplied arms to countries
such as Saudi Arabia and Israel; Israel is continuously involved in armed
conflict, and Saudi Arabia is not particularly known for its human rights
policies. 37 Another glaring example concerns Turkey. In 1997, the United
States banned light weapons sales to Turkey because of the likelihood that they
could be used "to repress a civilian population."'3'  Nevertheless, the State
Department approved an export to Turkey of materials for the manufacture of
ammunition, carbines and pistols in excess of five million U.S. dollars
worth. 39 From 1995 to 1997, Turkey received a total of 3.1 billion U.S.
dollars in U.S. arms exports." With total arms exports in that same period
reaching 77.8 billion U.S. dollars, it is hardly surprising that the United States
is hesitant to join a consensus on a document that affects a profitable industry.
Second, even presuming that states are willing to help, profit and corruption
cannot be eliminated; in fact, prohibitions will actually increase the profit
margin and induce even further corruption. Hypothetically, substantial
compliance with the Programme of Action's measures would result in a
reduction in the illicit arms trade. Elementary economic principles teach us
that the obvious consequence will be a consummate increase in price, which
will further result in increased profiles.'4 ' High profitability may therefore
drive the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons to heights even greater
than those before the Conference's measures are in place. 42
136 SeeReport on SmallArms Issued by Belfer Center, HARv. UNIv. GAZETTE, Dec. 16, 1999,
available at http://www.news.harvard.edu/gazette/1999/12.16/belfer.htn.
' See Lora Lumpe, The Leader of the Pack, BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS,
January/February 1999, vol. 55, no. I, available at http://www.thebulletin.org/issues/1999/
jflumpe.html.
138 Id.
139 Id.
140 See U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, WORLD MILITARY EXPENDITURES AND ARMS TRANSFERS 1998,
Fact Sheet Released by Bureau of Verification and Compliance, Aug. 21, 2000, available at
http://www.fas.org/man/docs/wmeat98/wmeat98fs.html.
,41 See, e.g., HUBERT HENDERSON, SUPPLY AND DEMAND 15 (1958) (stating that "[w]hen...
demand exceeds supply, the price tends to rise"); see also DESERPA, MICROECONOMIC THEORY
22 (1998) (stating that "when supply decreases... price increases and quantity decreases").
142 Keep in mind, the Conference seeks to make illicit transfers more difficult to achieve than
before. Imposing greater roadblocks in the black market will up the ante in profitability because
of the greater risks that accompany participation in that market. See S.K. RAY, ECONOMICS OF
THE BLACK MARKET 9, 11, 17 (1981); see also DESERPA, supra note 141, at 29 (1998) ("[T1he
black market price also reflects cost increases incurred in an effort to evade the law."). Further,
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High profitability, characteristic of the small arms/light weapons trade, also
fosters corruption. Official corruption is almost universal, and is not
necessarily confined to "unstable" states; government corruption is so
prevalent that many organizations are calling for a convention to eradicate it.
Already, the small arms trade is wrought with corruption at various levels of
government. In Argentina, former President Carlos Menem was indicted for
allegedly selling 100 million U.S. dollars worth of explosives and light
weapons.'" Additionally, a scandal recently erupted in South Africa, where
African National Congress members were accused of receiving kickbacks and
other official wrongdoing in connection with a $5.5 billion U.S. dollars arms
procurement contract.
4 5
The Conference, in this respect, utterly fails. The Programme of Action,
which employs measures to curb an already illegal transaction, will merely
exacerbate the corruption aspect of the small arms/light weapons trade.
Further reducing the supply of arms will undoubtedly render the trade even
more lucrative for traffickers.'" This is not to suggest that the international
community should ignore illicit arms transfers; rather, it should be a clear
signal that merely making the traffickers' already nefarious trade more
profitable will not suffice. It is certain that the most effective approach to the
problem is to decrease the demand for small arms and light weapons, or at least
reduce the need to use these weapons. Thus, the international community must
confront the root problems that create the need for small arms and light
weapons, such as undemocratic institutions, inequality, oppression, and
genocide. Dealing with these issues will be difficult, but without these
solutions, any successful curbs on the current illicit trade will be an illusory
accomplishment-a meaningless trophy to place on the international mantle.
Curbing arms production will not decrease demand, and will not destroy the
for a historical example of failures of this method of regulation, see Erik G. Luna, Our Vietnam:
The Prohibition Apocalypse, 46 DEPAuL L. REv. 483 (1997) (discussing the American "War on
Drugs").
"I See Press Release, United Nations, With Strong Political Will, Governments Could
Develop U.N. Convention Against Corruption By 2003, Third Committee Told (Oct. 15, 2001)
(on file with author).
See Howard LaFranchi, Small Wars, Small Arms, Big Graft, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR,
July 10, 2001, at 12.
145 See id.
'" See RAY, supra note 142, at 17 (stating that "with the increase in potential risks on the
investment coefficient, the profits will increase or decrease mostly on the extent of risk-taking").
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root causes of destabilizing accumulations of small arms and light weapons:
inequality and oppression.
D. Small Arms Control, Oppression, and Genocide
The Conference's most obvious failing is that it can be used by oppressors
and tyrants to commit genocide and other violations of human rights. The
Conference seeks to curb and eliminate all "illicit" transfers of small arms and
light weapons, where "illicit" refers to international transfers which are
"contrary to the laws of states and/or international law."' 47 Member states to
the Conference who approve of the Programme of Action are to undertake
various measures 4" to "prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit trade in small
arms and light weapons in all its aspects."'49 These measures can then become
one of the many implements of oppression in the tyrant's toolbox; the despot
can merely declare that his constituents are forbidden under national law to
possess "small arms and light weapons," which includes a vast range of
firearms, from the common revolver, to AK-47s and anti-aircraft missile
systems.' Once unarmed, any portion of the populace that is deemed
undesirable, including ethnic groups or political opponents, could become easy
targets for oppressive regimes.
Although many would characterize such a scenario as a conspiracy
theorist's fantasy, oppression, genocide, and political disappearances have
become scenes A faire of human civilization. The twentieth century has been
particularly violent; some have suggested that it should be referred to as "the
age of genocide, since the genocides of this century have killed more than four
times as many people as all the wars and revolutions of the same time period
combined."'' Governments or other authoritarian regimes have been the
predominant perpetrator of genocides and mass murder during the same
period.'52 While the exact numbers of deaths may still be at issue, one
commentator has stated that "during the first eighty-eight years of this century,
almost 170 million men, women, and children have been shot, beaten, tortured,
'41 See 1997 REPORT, supra note 12, 57.
"4I See Part I of this Note, infra, for a discussion on the particular measures employed by the
Programme of Action; see also FINAL REPORT, supra note 2.
'49 See FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 10.
So See 1997 REPORT, supra note 12, 26.
151 ALEX ALVAREZ, GOVERNMENTS, CITIZENS AND GENOCIDE: A COMPARATIVE AND
INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH 10 (2001).
"I See id. at 57.
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knifed, burned, starved, frozen,. . . buried alive, drowned, hung, bombed or
killed" by governments. 5 3 Combining war casualties, the estimated deaths
attributable to governments in this century is approximately 203 million. 54 To
put this number in perspective, if these victims "were laid out head to toe,
assuming each to be an average of five feet tall, they would reach from
Honolulu, Hawaii," across the Pacific and the continental United States to
Washington D.C., "and then back again almost twenty times."' 55
The relevance of these grim figures to the Conference is obvious.
Governments are presumably responsible for ensuring the safety and security
of their citizens. Many existing governments thus pass weapons control
measures to ensure safety from harm. With the exception of some states, such
as the United States and Switzerland, "gun control" is a popular trend, and has
received almost unanimous support in international circles. "' However, gun
control laws, including those urged by the Programme of Action, can become
fatal or oppressive when administered by tyrannous governments.
A few examples can illustrate the tragic consequences that could result
from states' adherence to the policies and measures contained in the
Programme of Action. First, consider the small arms/light weapons controls
employed by Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. Prior to the Nazi rise to
power, the Weimar Republic instituted a comprehensive gun control law which
instituted strict licensing, registration, and marking regulations.'57 Thus,
although "law-abiding firearms owners were known to the authorities," the
"authority" in Germany was, unfortunately, the Nazi Party. Once the Nazis
were firmly in power, on March 18, 1938, Germany passed the Weapons Law,
which introduced further controls on civilian ownership of firearms; the Law
specifically prohibited Jews from operating businesses involved in the
manufacture of firearms and weapons,'58 and explicitly prohibited the issuance
of firearms permits "to Gypsies, or to persons who are itinerant like
Gypsies."' 59 Moreover, issuance of permits to acquire or carry firearms was
highly discretionary in that they were only granted to "persons of undoubted
reliability, and only if a demonstration of need [was] set forth."'' Of course,
'53 R.J. RUMMEL, DEATH BY GOVERNMENT 9 (1994).
154 See id. at 13.
'5 Id. (emphasis in original).
156 See, e.g., CIVIL SOCIETY GROUPs, supra note 89 and accompanying text.
,5 See SUAKIN ET AL., supra note 77, at 15 1.
158 Waffengesetz, v. 18.3.38 (RGBL S.265).
1 Waffengesetz, v. 18.3.38 (RBGL S.267).
16 Id.
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Nazi Party members were exempt from these requirements. 6 It is not
unreasonable to infer, therefore, that Jews were likely excluded from firearms
ownership as the strength of the Nazi party grew.'62 In the end, the Nazis
exterminated at least six million Jews and 258,000 Gypsies.'63
Germany's quest for a "final solution" took an interesting turn with
Germany's invasion of the Soviet Union. In 1918, Vladimir Lenin passed into
law a decree of the Council of People's Commissars, which required that all
firearms and ammunition were to be surrendered to the government.16 As in
Germany, members of the Communist Party were exempt. 65 Later, in 1920,
Lenin signed a decree imposing severe restrictions on firearms possession.'66
As Lenin's successor, Joseph Stalin, gained power, penalties for unauthorized
possession of firearms were increased significantly, and penalties for
unauthorized possession of knives were introduced. Article 58 was soon
thereafter passed, 61 imposing the death penalty for a wide range of infractions:
these included actions considered "counter-revolutionary" (Art. 58(1));
rendering assistance to any opposition to communism (Art. 58(4)); or
distributing "propaganda or agitation containing an appeal to overthrow,
undermine, or weaken the Soviet authority or to commit individual counter-
revolutionary crimes" (Art. 58 (10)).68 While Article 58 was in effect, the
Communist regime was seizing property from farmers and eliminating any
political opponents that frustrated Stalin's industrialization plans to finance the
Communist experiment. 69
The interesting interaction between the oppressive regimes of the Soviet
Union and Nazi Germany occurred during the German invasion of the U.S.S.R.
As the Nazis invaded, special units called einsatzgruppen were devised for the
sole purpose of eliminating undesirable persons (i.e. Jews and Gypsies). 70
Although the einsatzgruppen units were small, their Soviet Jewish and Gypsy
161 Id.
162 See SIMKIN ET AL., supra note 77, at 153.
63 See RUM m, supra note 153, at 112. Although many historians disagree on the exact
Jewish death toll, six million is a mid-range estimate. Id.
'64 See SIAMIN ET AL., supra note 77, at 98.
165 Id.
166 Id.
167 See id. at 101.
I6 Id. at 136-43.
'69 See id. at 101-04.
'17 See id. at 157; see also Allan Ryan, Judgments on Nuremberg: The Past Half Century and
Beyond-A Panel Discussion of Nuremberg Prosecutors, 16 B.C. THID WORLD L.J. 193, 199
(1996) (Comments of Whitney Robson Harris).
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victims (who sometimes outnumbered their captors by ten to one) provided
little resistance as the victims were "unarmed, bewildered, and followed
orders...... Given the widespread oppression and strict weapons control
statutes existing in the Soviet Union, it is not surprising that these victims were
unarmed and unable to defend themselves, not only against home-grown
tyrants, but also against foreign invaders.
The Soviet Union and Nazi Germany are only convenient examples, as
information relating to their brutal regimes and their genocidal and political
murders have been researched thoroughly. Other examples of government-
perpetuated mass murder include Turkey under the Ottoman Empire,
Communist China, Guatemala, Uganda, Cambodia,'72 Bosnia and Rwanda.'
These examples relate only to twentieth century genocides; this list does not
include regimes that oppress their people in other forms.'
The policies and measures contained in the Programme of Action would
have disallowed any arms transfers to any of the above-mentioned states for
groups who are resisting their oppressive governments. 75 While there are
many mitigating statements contained in the Programme of Action's preamble
regarding "inherent rights to individual or collective self-defense in accordance
with Article 51 of the U.N. Charter"' 76 and the "reaffirmance of the right of
self-determination of all peoples," the protection of these rights is illusory. '
It is unavoidable that if these measures are enacted as national law, or even
established as international norms, international arms transfers to individuals
or groups seeking to fight oppression in a state which has outlawed their
possession would be contrary to law. Any arguments to the contrary would
either be unrealistic, or would expose the Conference's fundamental faults. 78
' See SIMKIN ET AL., supra note 77, at 157.
172 See id. at 77.
173 See Helen Fein, Testing Theories Brutally: Armenia (1915), Bosnia (1992), and Rwanda
(1994), in STuDEEs IN COMPARATvE GENOCIDE 157 (Levon Chorbajian & George Shirinian eds.,
1999).
"I Afghanistan is a graphic example. See supra notes 114-17 and accompanying text.
171 The Programme of Action asks participating states to "place adequate laws... within their
area of jurisdiction .. in order to prevent ... [small arms and light weapons] diversion to
unauthorized recepients." FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 10, 2. To use Nazi Germany as an
example, a shipment of arms to German Gypsies by another country would be a "diversion to
unauthorized recipients." Id.
176 FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 7, 9.
177 See id. at 8, 9, 11.
178 An argument could be made that states would recognize a state which is oppressive and
would, due to conscience, allow arms shipments to opposition fighters in that country. This
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Further, to argue that arms embargoes would rectify a state's oppressive
practices misses the point; the embargoes would come too late to curb the
violence. By the time the oppression has occurred, the tyrannous state will
most likely be already armed, its citizens unarmed, and the damage already
inflicted. This is a most unsatisfactory approach to curbing violence.
In sum, the prevalence of genocide and politicide as methods of state policy
in the twentieth century show that summarily disarming the public could prove
costly. Until the international community can employ methods that reduce or
eliminate the occurrence of these crimes, a more humane approach would be
to at least give victims a fighting chance; access to small arms and light
weapons not only give victims a defense, but may also end oppression before
widespread warfare ever takes place."7 9
M. RECOMMENDATIONS
While the Conference's goals and concerns undoubtedly require the
attention of the international community, any successful effort to curb the
proliferation of conflicts, violence, oppression and civilian casualties requires
more than the simplistic idea of summarily disarming the public. Unfortu-
nately, this is the sole agenda of the U.N. Conference on the Illicit Trade in
Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects. It appears that the
Conference is aimed at curbing not only "illicit" transfers, but also legal
transfers. It is also apparent that "small arms and light weapons" are a
deceptively broad category, including practically any implement that could be
used to inflict harm on another. Significant effort would be helpful, first, in
evaluating the philosophy of disarmament as a realistic method of achieving
peace, and secondly, in acknowledging that more permanent and reliable
methods are available (although they may well be costly and tedious), to solve
the problems which prompted the Conference.
position inevitably shows that the policy of unilateral acquiescence to citizen disarmament is not
the solution to ending human rights violations.
"' Polsby & Kates, supra note 7, at 1267-69 (stating that despite attempts to disarm African-
Americans in the southern United States, the fact that African-Americans were arming
themselves in self-defense forced police intervention, and eventually encouraged "decent citizens
in the majority community to come to their aid").
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A. Rethinking Weapons Control as an Effective Peace Policy
Total disarmament, that is, the disarming of governments and civilians, is
both impractical and dangerous. First, disarming governments would not
initially be uniform, partly for fear there would be no reciprocity (the disarmed
government would be vulnerable to other governments which had not been
disarmed), and partly because in order to achieve enforcement, some entity
must actually enforce. This would realistically involve the use of firearms to
command compliance. Non-uniform disarmament would also create power
vacuums that would likely cause opportunistic conquests. Second, focusing
disarmament measures against civilians would be an invitation to corrupt and
oppressive govnernments, as there would be no check on government abuses.
Firearms can be regulated to minimize accidental deaths, and persons
predisposed to violence can be prevented from possessing firearms by the rule
of law; but, oppressive regimes do not dissolve by request or statute. It is
unwise to prevent innocent civilians from defending themselves by vilifying
firearms as the root of all evil.
Further, any regulatory regime that attempts to reduce the supply of an item
without reducing the demand is doomed to fail; one such example involves the
United States' efforts to eliminate alcohol and drug consumption.8 0 The result
of any efforts to eliminate "illicit" trafficking in small arms and light weapons
will only make the business more profitable for corrupt brokers and criminal
organizations. Reducing the supply of firearms to persons desperate to
eliminate tyranny without decreasing the demand is irrational and could pose
a threat to human life."' However, the demand for firearms to protect a
person's life, liberty and property from criminals and other oppressors can
never be completely eliminated, as power is an ultimate corruptor. Instead, the
international community should work to eliminate instances requiring
legitimate firearms use, such as curbing the root causes of inequality and
oppression. It would be a tragic mistake to deprive citizens of their right to
resist oppressive governments until the international community can eliminate
such conditions.18
2
1s0 See, e.g., Luna, supra note 142, at 517-23 (explaining concepts of supply-side and
demand-side economies).
" Cf id., supra note 142, at 518-23 (analogizing the same problem with the supply and
demand of illicit drugs).
38 The 1997 Report acknowledged that conflicts involving small arms and light weapons
arise from "complex political, commercial, socio-economic, ethnic, cultural and ideological
factors." See 1997 REPORT, supra note 12, 38.
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B. Narrowing the Scope of the Programme ofAction
To overcome the deficiencies already addressed in this Note, it is necessary
to narrow the Conference's focus on problem areas without simultaneously
reducing a citizens' ability to resist oppressive governments or regimes. First,
the blanket statement declaring that measures should be implemented to
"prevent manufacture of and illicit trafficking in small arms and light weapons,
or their diversion to unauthorized recipients" should be discarded or at least
qualified.8 3 This can be achieved by language that would allow shipments of
small arms and light weapons to persons under serious persecution or
oppression by state or non-state actors, despite its legality under the oppressing
government's laws. Because citizens are already deprived of their inherent
rights to collective and individual self-defense provided in Article 5 1 of the
United Nations Charter, and because rights of self-determination are
diminished by a national law, disallowing possession of small arms and light
weapons would effectively deny these rights under the sanction of international
law. 8 4
Secondly, the Programme of Action should not advocate that states should
"establish as criminal offenses under their domestic law the illegal .. .
possession... of small arms and light weapons within their areas ofjurisdic-
tion."'85 To "reaffirm" rights to individual or collective self-defense under
Article 5 1, and to the right of self-determination, and then request that states
criminalize the possession of the very items necessary to exercise this right, is
absurd. Of course, firearms are not the only method through which one can
assert one's rights to self-defense and self-determination." 6 One may resort
to civil disobedience, civil resistance, or violent resistance.' However, when
civil disobedience or civil resistence would be risky or futile, armed resistance
may be the only option short of acquiescing to oppression.'
Finally, there should be more focus on illegal arms brokers to reduce the
problems resulting from the use of small arms and light weapons by oppressors
and violators of the law. In this respect, the international community must be
encouraged to pursue this route of regulation. The Programme of Action
1s3 FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 10, 2.
184 U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
18S FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 10, 3.
186 See Rachael E. Schwartz, Chaos, Oppression, and Rebellion: The Use of Self-Help to
Secure Individual Rights Under International Law, 12 B.U. INT'L L.J. 255, 296 (1994).
187 See id.
's See id.
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already contains a provision requesting participating states to "develop
national legislation or administrative procedures regulating the activities of
those who engage in small arms and light weapons brokering."1"9 This is a step
in the right direction. A majority of arms transfers to conflict zones and
regimes that abuse human rights are facilitated by arms brokers. 90 Arms
brokers are often responsible for diversion of legal arms transfers to oppressive
regimes and rebel forces, which then use these arms to commit gross violations
of human rights. 9'
A blanket statement condemning brokering cannot be satisfactory or
effective, however. Any limitation on brokering must be tempered with the
ideal that citizens have the absolute right of self-protection and self-determina-
tion, '9 particularly when such citizens are in danger of oppression. Such
citizens should be allowed to possess firearms to protect their life, liberty and
property, regardless of where those firearms originated. Thus, the international
community should work to adopt measures that seek to pierce the veil of
secrecy that shrouds arms brokers, only to ensure that small arms and light
weapons do not end up in the hands of oppressors, criminals or terrorists. Yet,
until such tyrants and criminals remain at large, it would be absolutely
inhumane to permit citizens to face an arbitrary executioner unarmed.
Obviously, measures to curb iniquitous brokers will be difficult to
implement. Overseas investigations of broker misconduct and extradition
make extraterritorial enforcement of such provisions extremely difficult.'93
Evidence gathering and exchange between countries pose additional
problems.' 9 However, given the various worldwide efforts mobilized to
combat unchecked brokering activities, hopefully the international community
can resolve the issue.195
189 FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 11,1 14.
'" See Elise Keppler, PreventingHuman Rights Abuses By RegulatingArms Brokering: The
U.S. Brokering Amendment to the Arms Export Control A ct, 19 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 381, 388
(2001).
191 See id.
192 See U.N. CHARTER art. 51; see also FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 7-8.
"' See Keppler, supra note 190, at 389.
194 See id.
I'l See id. at 406.
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C. Reliable Methods of Achieving Peace
The most realistic and promising method of reducing the amount of
casualties resulting from small arms and light weapons use is the promotion of
equality, a democratic-style government, and spirited enforcement of penalties
punishing all who use firearms to commit criminal offenses against other
citizens.'96 The 1997 Report noted that small arms and light weapons are
frequently used in conflicts which result from "political, commercial, socio-
economic, ethnic, cultural and ideological" causes. '97 It further notes that
"such conflicts will not be finally resolved without addressing the root
causes."' 98 It is time to finally address these root causes, while still enabling
victims to adequately defend themselves against criminals and despots.
The most positive step towards addressing these causes is the adoption of
democratic institutions. In the period of 1816 to 1991, no wars were fought
between democracies, although many were fought against nondemocracies.'9
Of the fifteen most deadly regimes of the twentieth century (in terms of murder
by government authority), none were democracies."° While democracies are
not necessarily the perfection of equality and justice, democratic governments
appear to be much less lethal to their citizens.
Such an approach would obviously be inefficient and undeniably costly.
However, in conjunction with sufficient enforcement of law that penalizes
violent offenders, it is perhaps the only method to curb the violence attributed
to small arms and light weapons. To do otherwise would mock the millions of
victims of genocide, oppression, and indiscriminate violence.
IV. CONCLUSION
The United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade of Small Arms and
Light Weapons in All Its Aspects represents true progress by the international
community in addressing the serious concerns of indiscriminant violence,
crime and oppression that plague modem society. As the twentieth century has
been particularly violent, it is comforting to realize significant thought and
deliberation has been devoted to this subject. Yet there are significant flaws
'
9 , See SIMKIN ET AL., supra note 77, at 136-41. Crimes such as murder, assault, rape,
robbery, etc are implied.
" See 1997 REPORT, supra note 12, 1 38.
198 Id.
'99 See RUMMEL, supra note 153, at 2.
200 Id. at 7.
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with the product of this deliberation, the Programme of Action. First, the
Programme of Action is not a binding principle of international law. It is
conceded that the Conference's policies could at some point in the future
become the basis of binding customary international law, or alternatively,
become the basis of a binding treaty. However, this concession cannot
mitigate the fact that years of effort and study have produced a document that
does very little to prevent small arms from reaching the hands of oppressors,
criminals and the like. Secondly, there is crucial ambiguity within the
Programme of Action, specifically in the definition of what constitutes a
"small arm" or "light weapon," and what realistically constitutes an "illicit
transfer." The terminology provided in the Programme of Action and other
developmental documents is unsatisfactory. Regarding the definition of small
arms and light weapons, the apparent ambiguity underscores the fact that the
international community cannot focus on the core of the problem, that of
military-style weapons. Further, this ambiguity may cost necessary political
capital in any future attempt to limit arms transfers in binding treaties.
The problem of what constitutes an "illicit" transfer poses a similar
dilemma. The Programme of Action gives a brief and succinct definition of
the term "illicit"; yet, such a definition cannot remain given the breadth and
diversity of problem areas and their underlying characteristics. Some transfers
that may, under the Programme of Action, be adjudged as illicit may not be
undesirable. Such a dry definition must be enlarged or qualified to confront
dissimilar situations.
Third, impediments to implementation will render the Programme of Action
brilliant on paper, but useless in practice. While stable states will have little
difficulty in enacting and enforcing the suggested provision, the problem areas
the Conference seeks to remedy face prohibitive conditions of corruption, high
profitibility, and the high value of the world-wide arms industry in general.
Finally, and most importantly, the policies and provisions within the
Programme of Action, if ever enacted as binding law, would allow the
disarmament of citizens, exposing them to the whims of oppressors and
tyrants. With the prevalence of genocide and government-sponsored killings,
it is inhuman to prevent potential victims from protecting themselves against
such arbitrary threats. Disarming the public absolutely prevents citizens from
the ability to protect their life, rights, and property, and effectively reduces the
rights of self-defense and self-determination to mere verbiage. As the
enjoyment of these rights can never be fully guaranteed, the protection of
human rights depends on just resistance to oppressors and criminals, and
armed resistance may sometimes be the only option. To render a human being
[Vol. 31:681
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defenseless under the guise of law would be unconscionable in such circum-
stances.
To achieve the goals espoused by the Conference, several measures are
suggested. First, the international community should reconsider blanket
disarmament as an effective method of achieving peace and tranquility. In
particular, the act of making all arms transfers contrary to the laws of states or
international law "illicit" cannot be sufficient. What must be done is not to
reduce arms, but reduce the need for using arms. This can be accomplished by
advocating democratic-style institutions to properly protect human rights and
keep governmental power contained. Further, efforts to investigate and
prosecute unscrupulous arms brokers that supply small arms and light weapons
to oppressors and terrorists should be placed at the forefront. Until such
measures are pursued, mankind's status naturalis will remain consonant with
Kant's somber description.

